Background and Objectives Globally, blood safety interventions have been successful in mitigating risk of the major transfusion-transmitted (TT) viruses. However, strategies that address risk from parasites are comparatively limited. TT parasites are often regional in nature, posing unique challenges; we sought to understand their impact on blood safety.
Introduction
Worldwide, blood safety interventions have primarily targeted transfusion transmissible viruses. This strategy has been highly effective at reducing the transmission risk associated with HIV, HBV, HCV and West Nile virus [1, 2] . However, it has long been recognized that parasitic agents are also transmitted by transfusion and pose significant risk to blood recipients. Historically, parasites have assumed lower priority in the context of blood transfusion safety. However, with the successful mitigation of viral risk to very low levels (at least in highincome countries), parasites have gained greater visibility and prominence. Although parasitic infections are often regional in nature, they pose a unique and growing challenge to the broader transfusion medicine community as demonstrated by the following examples. First, despite having made great strides in decreasing the global burden of malaria, an estimated 212 million people are still infected each year, and approximately 429 000 deaths annually are attributed to malaria [3] . Blood centres throughout the world are actively engaged in malaria prevention, using a variety of measures: screening questions and risk-based deferral, testing and/or pathogen inactivation [4] . Second, Chagas disease, caused by Trypanosoma cruzi, represents a blood safety risk not only in Latin America, but also in non-endemic countries due to global migration of infected donors [5] . Third, Babesia microti, a tick-borne protozoan parasite, has been responsible for over 200 cases of transfusion-transmitted babesiosis in North America alone [6, 7] ; however, licensed blood screening assays have only recently been approved, yet not widely implemented. Further, reports of B. microti and other Babesia species are steadily increasing worldwide, including reports from Australia, Asia and Europe [8] [9] [10] . Finally, ongoing war and displacement of civilians have led to an increase in cases of leishmaniasis in parts of North Africa and the Middle East [11] . Taken together, these and other parasitic agents continue to pose global challenges.
Notwithstanding the recognition of transmission risks associated with parasites, attempts to address these agents are often supplanted by competing priorities that redirect resources elsewhere as illustrated by the recent emergence of Zika virus in the Americas [12] . Given the emphasis placed on viral agents, parasites and other classes of pathogens have received comparatively less attention, yet pose significant risk to the blood supply. The regional nature of many parasitic infections has led to disparate approaches to prevent their transmission by blood transfusion. In part, differences in mitigation strategies can be attributed to the socioeconomic situation in each county, variation in parasite epidemiology, availability of quality diagnostic tools and levels of public health concern. Through the auspices of The Working Party on Transfusion Transmitted Infectious Diseases (WP-TTID) of the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT), we sought to better understand the current impact of parasitic agents on blood safety via implementation and analysis of a survey instrument distributed to the ISBT Membership.
Methods
As a component of the WP-TTID, the Subgroup on Parasites (SoP) is focused on the impact of parasitic agents on blood safety and transfusion medicine. In support of this mission, the SoP developed an electronic questionnaire (see Fig. S1 ) on the 'Impact of Parasitic Infections' that was distributed to transfusion medicine leaders in 100 countries during December 2012 and subsequently returned via e-mail by April 2013. Initially, we relied upon a distribution list of blood centres that was provided by ISBT, but given the over-representation of highincome countries, additional blood collection organizations in Africa, Asia, Central America and South America were contacted. Fig. 1 represents the distribution of countries that received the electronic 'Parasite Survey'.
While the survey contained detailed questions concerning the respondent country's blood collections, donations status and mode of donation, it primarily focused on parasite-specific questions pertaining to the following four diseases: babesiosis, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis and malaria. For each agent/disease, respondents were asked to provide the cumulative number of historical TT cases, approximate number of cases per year, year of the last case and the number of cases associated with the death of the transfusion recipient. Respondents were also asked to comment on the epidemiology of these parasitic agents/ diseases in their country, policies to mitigate risk of transmission, including the use of risk factor questions, outright deferral or pathogen reduction. If donor screening was in place, we inquired about the screening method in use (e.g. thick smear, ELISA, IFA) the number of donations tested, the number that tested positive and any use of follow-up or supplemental testing. The survey respondents were also asked to provide an assessment of public health perceptions in each country in regard to the four parasitic diseases listed above.
Results

Survey distribution and responses
A total of 28 (28%) surveys were returned from 100 distributed worldwide (Fig. 1) . Thirteen surveys were returned from Europe (Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Ireland, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Wales), six from the Americas (Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and USA), four from Africa (2 from South Africa; 1 each from Ghana and Tunisia), three from Asia (Hong Kong SAR China, Israel and Russia) and two from Oceana (Australia and New Zealand).
Babesiosis
Only two (7%) respondents, USA (n = 162) and Canada (n = 1), reported historical cases of transfusion-transmitted babesiosis (TTB) ( Table 1) . With the exception of three cases ascribed to B. duncani (endemic in California and the Pacific Northwest), all TTB cases were caused by B. microti, which is endemic in the Northeast and Upper Midwestern USA. At the time of the survey, systematic blood screening was not in use in any of the respondent countries; however, investigational arrayed fluorometric immunoassay (AFIA) and qualitative real-time PCR were being evaluated in the USA [7, 13] , and were subsequently licensed for blood screening by FDA. Seven (25%) respondent countries reported risk factor questions in use for possible infection (e.g. vector exposure, travel/ birth/residency in an endemic location) and nine (32%) reported permanent donor deferral for a history of babesiosis. While pathogen reduction was used in several countries, none reported use of a technology effective in red blood cells, the host cell for Babesia. Perceptions of babesiosis as a priority, both by public health authorities and by the public, suggest low priority; specifically, only two (7%) and one (4%) countries ranked TTB as a priority by public health authorities or public, respectively.
Chagas disease
Historical cases of transfusion-transmitted Chagas (TTC), including associated deaths, were reported in five countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Spain and USA) ( Table 2) . Three of these countries identified the percentage of the overall population living in endemic areas: Brazil 8%, Guatemala 12Á6% and Mexico 35%. Risk factor questions were used in 19 of 23 (82Á6%) responding countries, Fig. 1 Worldwide map indicating blood institutions within countries (identified by open stars ☆) that received the parasite survey (n = 100). Solid black stars (★) signify those blood institutions that responded to the survey (n = 28). For some countries, more than one blood organization received the survey and in some instances, more than one blood organization within a country responded.
including questions regarding travel, birth/residency in an endemic country and vector exposure. Questions were used for outright deferral, selection of donors for testing or both. Donors in eight countries were temporarily deferred for 4-6 months based on risk; one country used a 3-year deferral period. Permanent deferral was employed in 15 countries using a variety of criteria, including a history of Chagas (Table 2) . Risk-based selective testing (i.e. EIA, ELISA, IFA or IHA) was reported in eight countries, mandatory universal testing was utilized in Brazil, while the USA was unique in requiring onetime testing (ChLIA) of all donors (i.e. no repeat testing). The majority of responses (16/18) considered that current screening methods were efficacious against TTC. Only four respondents (i.e. Brazil, Spain, South Africa and USA) ranked Chagas disease as a moderate/high priority for public health authorities, with the majority (n = 16) of countries ranking concern as low to very low.
Similarly, among responses regarding the public's perception of Chagas only Spain listed concern as moderate/ high, while 20 countries identified concern as absent to low.
Leishmaniasis
No historical cases of transfusion-transmitted leishmaniasis (TTL) were reported by the 28 survey respondents ( Table 3) . Reports of endemic Leishmania sp. were limited and primarily associated with tropical/sub-tropical (e.g. Brazil, Honduras) and Mediterranean (e.g. Croatia, Israel) regions. Endemic species reported included L. amazonensis, L. infantum, L. major and L. tropica. No respondent reported blood screening procedures for exposure to Leishmania sp., but several employed risk factor questions to mitigate risk of TTL. Eleven countries permanently deferred donors reporting risk, especially a history of leishmaniasis, often visceral forms. Several countries (e.g. Poland, Russia, South Africa, USA) deferred donors for 6 months to 3 years based on travel, birth/residence in an endemic country or a history of disease, similar to procedures used by some countries to mitigate malaria transmission. In general, concern by public health authorities was relatively low among respondents, with the exception of those countries where the parasite was endemic. In countries like Brazil, Croatia, Tunisia and South Africa, public health concerns among authorities rose to moderate levels of concern; however, the general public's concern regarding Leishmania sp. was virtually absent in all countries.
Malaria
Six survey respondents (i.e. Brazil, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Russia and South Africa) identified as being endemic or having endemic regions for malaria. However, they reported relatively few cases of transfusion-transmitted malaria (TTM) (e.g. Brazil = 2; South Africa = 2 or 3) or the absence of reportable data (Table 4) . Among endemic countries, four used risk-based deferrals to reduce TTM, whereas Ghana and Guatemala did not report specific interventions since the entire or vast majority of the country, respectively, was considered endemic. In endemic countries with risk-based deferrals, risk was regional with large portions of the country Number of countries reporting a given ranking. considered low risk or malaria free. To mitigate risk, Brazil tests for malaria in endemic areas. Twenty-one non-endemic countries participated in the survey (Table 4) . Among non-endemic countries, TTM was very rare in recent years. Indeed, while 107 historical cases have been reported in the USA, in recent decades there has been only one case reported every 1-2 years. Germany reported 15 historical cases, but the most recent TTM case occurred in 1998. Similarly, England reported five historical cases with the last case in 2003, while France reported two historical cases, the most recent case in 2012. In non-endemic countries, malaria risk was primarily related to travel, especially for former residents of endemic areas who may be semi-immune, without any obvious symptoms. Several countries deferred donors with travel history, generally with a longer deferral period for former residents. Some countries permanently deferred for a history of malaria. Twelve countries reported using selective testing, although in some cases it was restricted to certain blood centres. Screening assays detected antibodies to malaria, generally P. falciparum and P. vivax. Donor selection criteria varied between countries, but generally there was a 4-to 6-month waiting period (as per Council of Europe or JPAC [Joint United Kingdom Blood Transfusion Services Professional Advisory Committee] guidelines [14, 15] ) after return from an endemic area to allow antibodies to develop with more stringent criteria for former residents. For example, in France donors who have travelled were tested on the first donation in the 3 years after return, whereas former residents of an endemic area were tested on the first donation no matter how long since they had entered France. Most countries rated malaria concern by public health authorities to be moderate to high (n = 12); two of five countries that rated concern as high had endemic risk. In contrast, most countries rated the general public's concern regarding malaria to be low (n = 10).
Discussion
Broadly speaking, parasites that present a transfusion risk are a geographically diverse group of pathogens, with some overlap, primarily in the tropics. In addition, they pose specific challenges with respect to clinical penetrance and prognosis, often causing asymptomatic infections in donors that can have severe consequences in blood recipients, including mortality. Compared to viral agents for which a plethora of studies in blood donors have been published, data on parasitic agents are fractured and extremely limited. Lastly, blood screening for parasites based on molecular platforms faces unique challenges since malarial and babesial parasites reside intraerythrocytically, thereby requiring cellular blood fractions for testing. Clearly, there are widely disparate approaches for addressing transfusion-transmitted parasites, spanning risk-based questionnaires, deferral policy and testing (e.g. selective vs. universal). In part, the decision to adopt a given approach is based on the epidemiology of the parasite, test availability, public health priorities and socioeconomic constraints. Nonetheless, the lack of standardization across countries suggests low prioritization despite the shared epidemiology of these agents in many instances. There are no licensed blood screening assays for leishmaniasis; in the case of babesiosis, licensed assays were only recently approved. The absence or limited Number of countries reporting a given ranking. availability of licensed assays can in part be explained by the reluctance of manufacturers to develop assays which may have only limited use or perhaps more importantly, are intended for agents for which there is a perceived lack of need. In the case of leishmaniasis, historical data indicate that there have been only about 15 cases of TTL globally, almost all of which were associated with visceral leishmaniasis, and most occurred decades ago [16, 17] . In the absence of a public health need, licensed tests for TTL are unlikely to be developed/implemented and current strategies based on donor deferral appear to be a reasonable approach to mitigating risk. In contrast, blood screening assays designed to prevent TTB were only recently approved and clearly are needed based on an ongoing blood safety threat. Unlike leishmaniasis, which has a more global distribution, cases of TTB have been reported almost exclusively in North America (i.e. the USA) [6] , but cases have also been reported in Japan and Germany [18, 19] . Moreover, based on current knowledge of Babesia epidemiology, the risk for TTB in the USA is regional in nature, suggesting the possible implementation of selective testing (i.e. high-risk areas) as licensed testing is phased in. Socioeconomic issues likely also play a role in determining mitigation strategies, especially for testing. In general, high-income countries are early and more frequent adopters of expensive molecular approaches such as NAT to mitigate risk. In contrast, socioeconomic constraints in low-to middle-income countries often preclude the implementation of NAT. In many cases, decisions to mitigate transfusion-associated risk favour less expensive and low technology approaches, albeit with lower test specificity and sensitivity. As stated, blood screening assays for leishmaniasis are unlikely to be developed due to an absence of public health need. Furthermore, since leishmaniasis primarily afflicts persons in resource limited countries, it is doubtful that available resources would be directed towards developing tests to prevent TTL. Similar economic constraints may impact malaria test development as well. In developed countries, testing may be implemented for agents that perhaps pose a limited threat (e.g. Zika virus) or a regional threat (e.g. Babesia) to blood safety, in part driven by public health demands of the general population.
Mitigation strategies also differ dramatically in endemic versus non-endemic countries. For endemic countries, test strategies are often implemented (e.g. Chagas), unless the agent is so pervasive (i.e. malaria) that most of the population has been exposed (e.g. Ghana), rendering testing unnecessary or impractical. For non-endemic countries, risk is usually attributable to travellers or immigrants who were infected while visiting or living in an endemic country. Indeed, for Chagas there remains a potential risk to the blood supply given ongoing immigration from endemic countries or vertical transmission from infected mothers [20] . Mitigation in non-endemic countries is generally addressed through deferral based on risk factor questions, testing of donors identified with risk or in some cases testing alone [21] [22] [23] . Risk of TTB is currently limited to North America, but surprisingly, risk factor questions are used in many non-endemic countries. Similarly, risk factor questions are used in Canada and the USA to mitigate risk associated with transmission of malaria. However, risk factor questions generally have low specificity, thereby limiting their utility. Nonetheless, they offer the first line of defence against infectious risk.
An alternative and a more generic approach to mitigating risk associated with parasites is implementation of pathogen inactivation (PI). Several PI platforms have demonstrated efficacy against different TT parasites [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Thus, PI may provide an attractive alternative to blood screening for parasitic agents that are tested selectively (e.g. T. cruzi) or regionally (e.g. Babesia). Barriers to implementation remain including high cost and logistical hurdles, however, suggesting that PI may not represent a solution in the near term, or for resource poor countries. Presently, PI has only been licensed for use with apheresis platelets and plasma in the USA, but has broader applications in Europe and other locations, including for use with pooled platelets. In the absence of an approved red cell treated product, PI remains largely ineffective against malaria and Babesia sp. Implementing PI is not without significant cost, so for resource poor countries where leishmaniasis and malaria are endemic, PI may not yet be a viable alternative [31] . Indeed, the survey results suggest that PI has not been implemented on a large scale to specifically interdict transmission of parasites.
Based on assessments provided by survey respondents, parasitic infections engendered limited concern from a public health perspective. The lone exceptions were for public health authorities in those countries where specific parasites were endemic, thereby eliciting moderate levels of concern (e.g. Chagas disease in Brazil, babesiosis in the USA). Perhaps not surprisingly, the general public's perceived understanding of parasitic infections was universally very low to non-existent, further emphasizing the status of parasites as a class of pathogens receiving lower importance. While the media is often quick to publish accounts of the latest exotic named virus (e.g. Zika, Powassan, Kyasanur Forest), the general public often remains unaware of the potential health burden posed by parasitic infections. In part, the transfusion medicine community should consider playing a role in educating the public regarding threats posed by parasitic infections.
Several limitations are inherent to this study. From the outset, we were challenged by the survey distribution network, which relied upon the ISBT membership list that is skewed towards high-income countries with particular over-representation in Europe. In contrast, parasitic infections primarily afflict people in low-income countries of the developing world (with the exception of Babesia). Thus, despite our efforts to include more blood centres in lowincome countries, the survey may not be representative and likely underestimates the impact of parasites in transfusion medicine. Additionally, by design the survey suffers from reporting bias whereby the data rely on individuals, albeit key personnel in transfusion services. Moreover, respondent data may not be broadly representative even within those countries which were included (i.e. respondents were highly selected whereby not all blood centres were included within a given country). A final limitation is the focus on parasites that cause babesiosis, Chagas, leishmaniasis and malaria. Other parasitic agents (e.g. Toxoplasma gondii, African trypanosomes) may play more prominent roles in developing countries than those targeted by the survey (e.g. babesiosis is only perceived as a public health issue in the USA and Canada).
Despite these limitations, the results of the current study suggest opportunities for additional related research studies. For example, risk of transfusion-transmitted Chagas extends beyond the endemic countries of Latin America, owing to migration of infected persons to countries that have been historically considered to be non-endemic. However, non-endemic countries in Europe, North America (i.e. Canada and USA) and Japan have all taken different approaches to mitigate Chagas risk. A better understanding of these mitigation strategies and the underlying rationale for their implementation may contribute to more sensitive and specific strategies to minimize associated risk. Similarly, while testing for malaria is routine in many endemic countries, interventions in non-endemic countries vary considerably. Efforts are underway to use the Risk Based Decision Making Framework to look for commonalities and understand the decision-making process employed in non-endemic countries to prevent TTM [32] . Finally, consideration should be given to refine surveys of risk associated with parasitic infections and targeting specific areas of risk (i.e. Africa, Central America). One avenue is to partner with ISBT affiliate organizations in target areas (e.g. Africa Society of Blood Transfusion) to develop, distribute and analyse future survey instruments.
In conclusion, parasites continue to pose a risk to blood safety. Ironically, while collectively rare, the successful mitigation of viral risk has rendered transfusiontransmitted parasitic infection more common, at least in certain settings. These infections continue to exact a human toll. Novel strategies that include screening and diagnostic tools, as well as pathogen inactivation systems, should be considered as potential options to achieve risk reduction in the future.
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